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THE INCOME TAXIntroduction and Summary
THIS book describes and analyzes some of the more important develop-
ments in dividend taxation and the role of dividends in the tax
structure. Many of these stand out in sharp relief against the historical
background of almost half a century of personal income taxation, as
shown primarily by the Treasury's annual tabulations of tax data,
Statistics of Income. Part of the report concerns income tax history,
with attention centered on dividends; part of it is concerned with
special features of dividends and the laws under which they have been
taxed. The book is organized around the following four topics:
1. The importance of dividends in personal and taxable income.
2. The extent to which dividend receipts have shown up on tax returns.
3. Tax liability traceable to dividends.
4. The "double taxation" of dividends and, more generally, the dif-
ferential taxation of corporate earnings, as well as recent methods
designed to provide income tax relief for stockholders.
In seeking a full answer to some of the questions raised in this
study, it will be necessary to look beyond dividends per se to the
corporate earnings that occasioned their payment, whether they were
distributed to stockholders, paid as taxes to government, or retained
in the corporate till.
Some of the data presented here go through 1958, some through
1957, and some stop even earlier, depending on the information
available at the time of writing.
It may be helpful at this point to set forth our main findings in
order to give the reader a sense of the scope of the study. The brief
summary which follows is necessarily oversimplified, and presents the
results without the qualifications that are necessary in interpreting
them.Dividends Under the Income Tax
importance of Dividends in Personal and Taxable Income
Throughout the history of the income tax a high percentage of per-
sonal dividend receipts can be traced to taxable returns. The per-
centage ranged between 60 and 90, even though the income tax did
not become a mass levy until World War II, because dividends have
always gone in large part to the upper income groups. For this reason
also, aggregate dividends reported on tax returns have generally moved
with total dividend payments despite sharp changes in exemption
levels.
Until World War II dividends characteristically constituted a much
higher percentage of taxpayers' adjusted gross income than of their
total personal income. Since the wartime extension of the income tax
to cover most of the population, however, the two percentages have
been very close.
In every year the percentage of taxpayers' income represented by
dividends rose with income class. For all income classes, the first years
of World War II mark the beginning of a period of sharp decline in
the importance of dividends as a component of taxpayers' income, not
because dividends fell in size but because the amount of wages and
salaries and entrepreneurial income subject to tax increased greatly.
The major part of dividends reported on taxable returns has gone
to taxpayers with over $5,000 of income (net income through 1943,
adjusted gross from 1944 on)—between 69 and 97 per cent without
correction of income for changes in the value of money, and between
77 and 99 per cent when real income (i.e., income levels adjusted for
changes inpurchasingpower) is used to mark off the income classes.
In general the number of taxable dividend returns has increased
over 1934—1957, which is consistent with other evidence of growth in
the number of stockholders. But in the more recent years of our study,
the number of dividend returns shows a much slower growth than
the estimates of stockowners.
Almost all dividend recipients had incomes of under $50,000. In all
the years for which the information could be obtained, never more
than 2.5 per cent and frequently less than 1 per cent had incomes
greater than this. Despite their small number, taxpayers in income
classes of $50,000 and over received a sizable proportion of total divi-
dends. In 1956, for example, they comprised 2.5 per cent of all taxable
dividend returns and received 36 per cent of the dividends reported
on such returns.
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Similarly, concentration shows up when dividend recipients are ar
rayed by size of dividend receipts. In 1950, for example, only 6 per cent
of all dividend recipients reported $5,000 or more of dividends, but
they received 65 per cent of all dividends reported by individuals on
tax returns. No other type of income was distributed in such a con-
centrated fashion.
Extent to Which Dividends Have Shown up on Tax Returns
In every year of the period 1936—1958, total dividends paid to indi-
viduals and fiduciaries (estates and trusts) exceeded the amount of
dividends that could be traced to tax returns. The difference between
the two is called here the dividend gap. A review of the gap over the
twenty-three-year period did not disclose a tendency for the under-
reporting of dividends to correct itself over time. During these years,
which witnessed a revolutionary conversion of the income tax from
a levy on a few citizens to one that reaches almost every income re-
cipient, the gap trended upward in absolute terms and relatively was
about as important near the end of the period as at the start.
An examination of the year-to-year changes in the dividend gap
suggests that its relative size roughly reflects taxpayer response to
variations in tax rates, especially tax rate increases. However, the
evidence on this point is not clear-cut from 1950 on.
Estimates from a sample audit by the Bureau of Internal Revenue
of personal income tax returns for 1948 and from sample surveys by
the Internal Revenue Service of 1958 and 1959 tax returns suggest that
dividend underreporting is most serious among dividend recipients of
less than $25,000.
In the most recent year for which systematic estimates could be made,
1958, it appears that the Federal Government's revenue loss due to
dividend underreporting was between $200 and $240 million. (This
may be too high; see section in chapter 2 on 1959 survey.) This
figure is small relative to total personal income tax collections, but
that does not mean the problem is unimportant. A widespread feeling
that some taxpayers are not bearing their share of the tax load might
undermine the zeal with which many taxpayers police themselves.
Thus, the importance of dividend underreporting could transcend the
revenue loss directly associated with it.
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Tax Liability Traceable to Dividends
In order to determine how heavily dividends have been taxed under
the personal income tax alone, the aggregate tax liability of personal
income taxpayers was allocated among the components of their income
for every year, 1918—1957. Here we are concerned only with the per-
sonal income tax liability on dividends. The broader problem of the
taxation of corporate earnings will be taken up in the next section.
Two factors have dominated the weighted average effective rate on
dividends: the size of the dividend flow and its distribution, and the
progressivity of the personal income tax rate schedule. The special
tax provisions pertaining to dividends (their exemption from normal
tax through 1935 and the exclusion and tax credit introduced in 1954)
had only a slight effect.
Because dividends have always gone in large part to stockholders
in the upper income brackets, the proportion of tax liability attrib-
utable to them has always been higher than the dividend share of
adjusted gross income on taxable returns. Characteristically this ratio
has been two to one.
Through 1941 a large fraction of total personal income tax liability
—between one-fifth and one-half—was due to dividends. Since that date,
with the extension of the income tax to cover most income recipients,
dividend tax liability accounted for a smaller share, typically about
7 per cent of total tax liability.
In every year we observe successively higher values in going from
dividends as a fraction of personal income to dividends as a fraction
of adjusted gross income on taxable returns and, finally, to dividend
tax liability as a fraction of total tax liability. This has imparted some
revenue flexibility to the income tax, since the dividend tax liability
has varied more markedly than dividends themselves. Since dividends
were a much more important component of the tax base before 1941,
the revenue flexibility they imparted was more significant in this earlier
period.
From 1940 on, between 15 and 25 per cent of dividends paid out to
individuals and others treated as such in the national income accounts
went into tax payments to the Federal Government. Before 1940 the
percentage was 10 or less.
We found a large difference between the average effective tax rates
on dividends and the marginal rates (those that would have applied
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on the average to a small increment in dividends proportionately dis-
tributed among all stockholders). As a rule, marginal rates were about
twice as high as effective rates. In 1929 the effective rate was 6.1 per
cent, the marginal rate 13.2 per cent; in 1952, they were 28.9 and 55.6,
respectively. Thus both rates increased substantially, the marginal
somewhat more than the average. In view of this, it is a puzzling finan-
cial fact that corporations tended to pay out about the same propor-
tion of after-tax earnings in the 1950's as in the 1920's. One would
expect, if tax considerations were a strong influence, that dividend
pay-out rates would be lower in the more recent period.
Income tax liability may be defined to cover corporate as well as
personal taxation. In this context, the personal income tax liability
on dividends should be added to the corporate tax on corporate earn-
ings to obtain the total tax liability on the earnings of corporate enter-
prises. In this view, the income taxes on corporate earnings make up
a sizable proportion of total income taxes: in recent years, 40 per cent;
in the earlier period of our study, well over 50 per cent, sometimes as
much as 75 or 80 per cent. This represents, of course, a much higher
fraction of income tax liability than corporate earnings represent of
national income. But these figures do not necessarily mean that cor-
porate earnings are "overtaxed." For a judgment on this matter, the
earnings of corporations must be related to the income class status of
the claimants thereof, i.e., the stockholders. It is to this range of ques-
tions that the next few paragraphs are directed.
The Differential Taxation of Corporate Earnings and
Stockholders
In the early years of the personal income tax, corporate rates were set
and dividends treated in such a manner that the corporate tax could
be viewed as a withholding appendage of the personal income tax, for
distributed earnings at least. Since 1919, for a number of reasons this
has not applied to distributed earnings. And from its very inception,
the tax treatment of retained earnings was not directly related to the
income circumstances of the stockholders on whose behalf the reten-
tion took place.
The fact that the two income taxes have not been integrated has
led variously to charges of "double taxation of dividends," unfairly
high or unjustly low taxation of retained earnings, or, more generally,
differential (unequal) taxation of corporate earnings. These and similar
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charges mirror one or another aspect of a multifaceted problem which
has been analyzed in successive steps. It is important to note that these
charges and our analysis both assume that the corporate tax is not
shifted and that present stockholders have not bought shares "free
of tax," i.e., that the selling price of shares has not been lower by the
present value of all expected future tax payments. (Or, perhaps, that
the stream of expected future tax payments has been finite and limited
to a small number of periods.)
As to distributed earnings and the problem somewhat inaccurately
designated as the "double taxation" of dividends, it is important to
recognize that the requirement that a corporation pay some tax
to the government before it distributes the rest to stockholders does
not mean that stockholders have been deprived by the full amount
of the corporate income tax payment. For had it not gone to the gov-
ernment but to the stockholders instead, some fraction of the corporate
tax would have been paid out as personal tax. The "extra" burden,
then, is the corporate tax minus the personal tax that would have been
due on the corporate tax. Since, for a given amount of earnings for
distribution (the pre-corporate-tax counterpart of dividends), the same
corporate tax applies no matter what the tax bracket (income level)
of the personal income taxpayer is, and since, also, the personal tax
rate that would have applied rises with the stockholder's income, the
"extra" burden falls as shareowner income rises. But there will al-
ways be some extra burden because the personal rates that would have
applied never equal or exceed 100 per cent.
As a numerical illustration of the "extra" burden, assume for sim-
plicity that the corporate tax rate is 50 per cent. Thus for every $1
of dividends, there are $2 of earnings for distribution. On this $2 the
20 per cent bracket stockholder would be taxed $1.20 ($1.00 of cor-
porate tax and 20 cents of personal tax on the dividend he received).
Had all the $2 been distributed to him with no corporate tax inter-
vening, he would have paid 40 cents of tax. Hence his "extra" burden
is 80 cents. Similar calculations for a stockholder in the 90 per cent
bracket give an "extra" burden of 10 cents. All other doubly taxed
stockholders fall between these extremes, with their "extra" burden
declining as their tax rate bracket rises. (The highest "extra" burden
falls on those not subject to the personal income tax who, in this con-
text, can be considered to fall in the zero rate bracket.)
In 1954, income tax relief for stockholders was provided by the ex-
clusion of the first $50 of dividends ($100 for joint returns) and 4 per
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cent of additional dividends as a credit against tax. Per dollar the
exclusion clearly affords the greatest relief to those who are in the
highest marginal rate brackets, and least to those in the lowest. (And,
paradoxically, none at all to those in the zero bracket.) The credit
is more democratic; it involves an equal amount of relief for all stock-
holders (except that, again, no relief is provided those who pay no
personal income tax). To return to our numerical example, the credit
applies 4 cents of relief to each stockholder. The 20 per cent bracket
stockholder has his "extra" burden cut 5 per cent from 80 to 76 cents;
the 90 per cent bracket stockholder ends up with an extra burden of
6 cents whereas it was 10 cents before the credit relief, thus experiencing
a 40 per cent cut in his "extra" burden. A 10 per cent credit would
completely relieve the high income stockholder, but would leave the
stockholder inthe20 per cent bracket with 70 cents of overtaxation
for each $2 of earnings for distribution generated on his behalf. There
is no need to belabor the point further. But it is appropriate to explain
why the credit works in this way.
If double taxation exists, then it could be remedied completely, defi-
nitionally and arithmetically, in one of two ways: by removing either
the corporate tax on earnings or the personal tax on dividend income.
Removing the personal tax would leave all stockholders subject to the
flat rate corporate tax, a rate divorced from their personal income
("ability to pay"). The same consideration applies to the partial alle-
viation of double taxation effected via the dividend credit, since it is
a step toward removal of the personal tax. If the credit were sufficient
to do this fully for one particular personal income tax marginal rate
bracket, it would leave all stockholders at rates above this undertaxed
and all those at rates below this overtaxed compared with the rates
they pay on income from other sources. However, if the credit were
applied not as a fixed proportion (4 per cent) of dividends, but as a
fixed fraction of the extra burden, relief would, of course, be in the
same proportion for all stockholders. In terms of the illustrative fig-
ures used earlier, a credit of 10 per cent of the extra burden would cut
the differentially heavier tax load for the stockholder in the 20 per
cent bracket from 80 to 72 cents; for the 90 per cent bracket stock-
holder, the decline would be from 10 to 9 cents. A reduction in the
corporate tax rate is the equivalent of a credit of this kind. For
example, lowering the corporate rate from 50 to 45 per cent would
cause the same change in the extra burden as a tax credit of 10 per
cent of the extra burden.
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As for the trend in overtaxation measured by the extra burden com-
puted as an incremental rate on earnings for distribution, we found
pronounced and continuous growth over the whole period under study
for low income stockholders, a sizable but less pronounced rise for those
in the middle income brackets, and a very moderate increase for those
at the highest income levels (say $500,000) for whom, indeed, over-
taxation is currently smaller than in 1925—1931.
We stress that this conclusion applies to the differentially heavier
tax on corporate earnings. It does not mean that current tax rates are
lower than in 1925—1931; on the contrary, they are much higher now.
But the absolute increase in personal income tax rates were not as
heavy for the lower and middle income stockholders as for those in
the top income brackets. And this is the clue to the difference in the
trend in overtaxation at the different income levels. In the most re-
cent years of the period under study, corporate and personal rates were
both higher than in 1925—1931. Other things unchanged, the higher
corporate rate would mean greater overtaxation; also, other things
equal, the higher personal rate would mean less overtaxation, because
the higher the personal rate that would have applied, the less the
stockholder is deprived when his corporation pays a tax on its earn-
ings. At the lower and middle income levels, the rise in personal rates
was not large enough to overcome the effect of the rise in the corporate
rate; hence overtaxation increased. At the upper income levels, how-
ever, personal rates rose sufficiently to decrease overtaxation by more
than it was increased by the rise in the corporate tax rate; therefore,
on net balance, overtaxation decreased.
Another way to measure the degree of overtaxation of earnings for
distribution is to determine how much a stockholder has left after the
corporate tax on earnings plus the personal tax on dividends, corn
pared with how much he would have had after tax if his earnings for
distribution had been taxed in full by the personal income tax alone.
On this basis, overtaxation has tended to increase markedly over the
period studied. But if the beginning and end of the period are com-
pared, the increase has been sharpest for the lowest tax bracket stock-
holders, not as sharp for those in the middle tax brackets, and even
less pronounced for those at the top of the income range. (See Chapter
4 for a more detailed discussion of this point.)
Of course, more than the tax treatment of distributed earnings is
involved in the extra burden on stockholders. The portion of corporate
earnings which is retained can be handled in much the same way as
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distributed earnings. On $2 of earnings for retention (the pre-corporate-
tax counterpart of retained earnings), $1 is paid in corporate tax, while
40 cents would have been paid by the 20 per cent bracket investor had
he been taxed currently on this $2, and $1.60 by the 90 per cent bracket
shareowner. Here, then, we can say the "extra" burden is not the cor-
porate tax, but the difference between the corporate tax and the per-
sonal tax that would have applied. The "extra" burden declines with
stockholder income level and after a point will become negative. That
is to say, the "extra" burden is positive when the corporate rate ex-
ceeds the personal rate; it is zero when the two are equal; and it is
negative when the corporate rate falls short of the personal rate that
would have applied. This formulation neglects the complication of
capital gains taxation, which is discussed in Chapter 4. No change in
principle is introduced but it does mean that the change from over-
to undertaxation of earnings for retention comes at a rate greater than
the actual corporate tax rate.
So far this summary has dealt with marginal dollars, but equally
interesting is what happens when we take account of the aggregate
amounts of earnings for distribution and earnings for retention. To
do this, we imputed corporate earnings and tax payments to stock-
holders and compared this with what they would have paid on these
imputations under the personal income tax alone, the difference be-
tween the actual and hypothetical tax burdens being the "extra" bur-
den, or benefit, as the case may be. A quick summary for a representa-
tive year (before any account has been taken of the exclusion and
credit) appears in Chart 9. As would be expected, the differential
("extra" burden computed as a rate) against earnings for distribution
declines with stockholder income but is always positive; the differ-
ential against earnings for retention likewise falls with stockholder
income, and changes from positive to negative. The weighted average
of these two measures, the differential against net corporate earnings,
follows the same pattern as the differentials that comprise it. Reflect-
ing the greater absolute magnitude in 1951 of earnings for retention,
it lies closer to that differential than the one on earnings for distribu-
tion. It too turned negative after a point.
Applying the provisions of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 to
the data for 1950 provides a picture of the relief granted average stock-
holders at selected income levels. The absolute amount of relief de-
clines with income. The relative degree of relief is U-shaped with in-
come, being higher at both the lower and upper ends of the stock-
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holder income scale than in between. This seems to run counter to
the findings noted above, but the reconciliation is simple. At the lower
stockholder income where the average amount of earnings for dis-
tribution is small, the exclusion (which gives more relief per $1 of
dividends) far outweighs the credit; hence the heavy degree of relief
here. Moving up the income scale, the exclusion fades in impor-
tance, and the amount of relief in absolute terms tends to approach
the constant represented by the credit. With the differential declining
with rising stockholder income, after a point, once more the higher
the average stockholder income, the greater is the relative degree of
relief.
12